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a b s t r a c t 
This paper analyses the assumptions underpinning a range of emerging EU and UK smart 
home cybersecurity standards. We use internet of things (IoT) case studies (such as the Mirai 
Botnet affair) and the criminological concept of ‘routine activity theory’ to situate our cri- 
tique. Our study shows that current cybersecurity standards mainly assume smart home en- 
vironments are (and will continue to be) underpinned by cloud architectures. This is a short- 
coming in the longevity of standards. This paper argues that edge computing approaches, 
such as personal information management systems, are emerging for the IoT and challenge 
the cloud focused assumptions of these standards. In edge computing, data can be stored 
in a decentralised manner, locally and analysed on the client using federated learning. This 
can have advantages for security, privacy and legal compliance, over centralised cloud-based 
approaches, particularly around cross border data flows and edge based security analytics. 
As a consequence, standards should start to reflect the increased interest in this trend to 
make them more aspirational and responsive for the long term; as ultimately, current IoT 
architectures are a choice, as opposed to inherent. Our paper unpacks the importance of 
the adoption of edge computing models which could enable better management of exter- 
nal cyber-criminality threats in smart homes. We also briefly discuss challenges of building 
smart homes that can accommodate the complex nature of everyday life in the home. In 
addition to technical aspects, the social and interactional complexities of the home mean 
internal threats can also emerge. As these human factors remain unresolved in current ap- 
proaches to smart home cybersecurity, a user’s security can be impacted by such technical 
design choices. 
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Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT - 2018, London, June 
2018) 
10 DCMS, ‘Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security’ (2018) 
< https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment _ data/file/747413/Code _ of _ Practice _ 
for _ Consumer _ IoT _ Security _ October _ 2018.pdf> accessed 12 May 
2020 
11 DCMS, ‘Mapping of IoT Security Recommendations, Guid- 
ance and Standards to the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer 
IoT Security’ (2018) < https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment _ data/file/ 
774438/Mapping _ of _ IoT _ _ Security _ Recommendations _ Guidance _ 
and _ Standards _ to _ CoP _ Oct _ 2018.pdf> accessed 12 May 2020 
12 ENISA, ‘IoT Security Standards Gap Analysis’ (2018) < https: 
//www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/iot- security- standards- gap- ity standards. These shape the design of smart home tech- 
ologies, indicate industry practice and act as ‘soft’ regula- 
ory tools. The risk of poorly secured domestic Internet of 
hings (IoT) devices can create both situational, physical and 
nformational harms to citizens. Accordingly, understanding 
ow different industry standardisation attempts view and are 
roposing to address these risks is important. Such standards 
an provide certainty to IoT vendors, and have cross jurisdic- 
ional reach, thus the values and norms they perpetuate is 
mportant. As a consequence, we proceed by asking: how can 
tandards, and the technology architectures on which they are 
ased, better respond to cybersecurity threats caused by IoT 
roducts? 
Even though extensive research has been conducted in the 
eld of IoT, its definition continues to be blurry and varies 
reatly. Each stakeholder’s definition tends to differ as it re- 
ects the perspective and objectives of a particular organi- 
ation, business or individual.4 The IEEE mapped state of the 
rt definitions as proposed by standardisation organisations,
hite papers, books, academia, national initiatives and other 
ources, in an attempt to create an all-inclusive definition of 
oT. It has concluded that “An IoT is a network that connects 
niquely identifiable “Things” to the Internet. The “Things”
ave sensing/actuation and potential programmability capa- 
ilities. Through the exploitation of unique identification and 
ensing, information about the “Thing” can be collected and 
he state of the ‘Thing’ can be changed from anywhere, any- 
ime, by anything.”5 IoT devices can be, for example, factory 
achinery, medical equipment or domestic appliances.6 In 
ur work, we will concentrate on domestic IoT. 
The omnipresence of IoT devices is already a reality in 
any countries and its further expansion worldwide seems 
et for the longer term. According to current industry estima- 
ions, there will be 21.5 billion products connected to the inter- 
et by 2025 (7 billion in 2018) .7 These estimates vary but the 
rend of rapidly increasing numbers of IoT products appears 
o continue. Data breaches and attacks linked to IoT devices 
re also likely to rise, partly due to exploits targeting cloud- 
ased architectures and poor security practices on devices (for 
xample, default passwords not being changed). The number 
nd high profile of recent security breaches suggest this will 
appen.8 
In response, there are a range of policy initiatives emerg- 
ng.9 In October 2018, the United Kingdom Department for 4 IEEE, ‘Towards a Definition of the Internet of Things (IoT)’ 
2015) < https://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE _ IoT _ Towards _ 
efinition _ Internet _ of _ Things _ Revision1 _ 27MAY15.pdf> ac- 
essed 27 October 2020 
5 H. C. Lin and N. W. Bergmann, ‘IoT Privacy and Security Chal- 
enges for Smart Home Environments’ (2016) 7 Information 44 
6 Ibid 
7 IoT Analytics, ‘State of the IoT 2018: Number of IoT Devices now 
t 7B – Market Accelerating’ (2018) < https://iot-analytics.com/ 
tate- of- the- iot- update- q1- q2- 2018- number- of- iot- devices- now- 7b/ >
ccessed 27 October 2020 
8 N. Neshenko and others, ‘Demystifying IoT Security: An Ex- 
austive Survey on IoT Vulnerabilities and a First Empirical Look 
n Internet-Scale IoT Exploitations’ (2019) 21 IEEE Communica- 
ions Surveys & Tutorials 2702 
9 I. Brass and others, ‘Standardising a Moving Target: The De- 

















igital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) aggregated different 
tandard setting sources in its “Code of Practice for Consumer 
nternet of Things (IoT) Security”10 and the associated “Map- 
ing of IoT security recommendations, guidance and stan- 
ards to the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Secu- 
ity".11 Concurrently, the European Union Agency for Network 
nd Information Security (ENISA) also mapped requirements 
o standards in its “IoT Security Standards Gap Analysis” .12 
hese documents helped us to identify and analyse the as- 
umptions upon which many cybersecurity standards have 
een written. In terms of standards, our main source was the 
uropean Telecommunications Standards Institute’s (ETSI) EN 
03 645 standard on Cyber Security for Consumer Internet 
f Things.13 It references various important works including 
he DCMS’s and ENISA’s documents mentioned above. The in- 
erplay between different standards as soft regulatory tools 
s complex. Formally, a standard is a “technical specification,
dopted by a recognised standardisation body, for repeated or 
ontinuous application, with which compliance is not com- 
ulsory” .14 Even though they do not have any legally binding 
orce, standards have a substantial impact on the workings of 
he IoT sector. They influence how public and private organi- 
ations act and require others to act. The DCMS work, for ex- 
mple, has fed into the ETSI IoT standard, but has also shaped 
he UK government emerging legislative efforts.15 
This paper analysed in detail one of the assumptions upon 
hich standards have been written – namely, that IoT devices 
nd services will continue to use primarily cloud-based ar- 
hitectures. Whilst this may be the case currently, long term, 
nalysis > accessed 12 May 2020 
13 ETSI, ‘EN 303 645 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of 
hings: Baseline Requirements’ (2020) < https://www.etsi.org/ 
eliver/etsi _ en/303600 _ 303699/303645/02.01.01 _ 60/en _ 
03645v020101p.pdf> accessed 20 July 2020 
14 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and 
f the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, 
mending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Direc- 
ives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 
007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parlia- 
ent and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC 
nd Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of 
he Council Text with EEA relevance 
15 DCMS, ‘Proposals for Regulating Consumer Smart Prod- 
ct Cyber Security - Call for Views’ (2020) < https://www. 
ov.uk/government/publications/proposals- for- regulating- 
onsumer- smart- product- cyber- security- call- for- views/ 
roposals- for- regulating- consumer- smart- product- cyber- 
ecurity- call- for- views > accessed 17 December 2020 




























































there is an increasing turn to integrating edge computing ap-
proaches.16 As such standards should reflect these aspirations
to enable longevity. The other assumption that we have iden-
tified is that standards seem to consider home environments
as safe spaces. This is not always the case and we wanted to
raise awareness that in-home threats linked to smart devices
may not be addressed by standards. 
We recommend that principles in standards should recog-
nise the value of edge computing, local data storage and an-
alytics approaches. Edge computing is in part driven by the
IoT and its need for increased data collection and analysis.
It refers to “a network with distributed computing resources
(including data storage and processing) where some of the
physical infrastructure that hosts these resources is located
in close geographical proximity to where data are generated
or needed for processing” .17 Edge computing brings benefits
of new mechanisms for data protection compliance and in
home security management 18 .19 In this paper, we often refer
to the Databox research project 20 as a prototype edge com-
puting system (not yet commercialised) and a model personal
information management system (PIMS) built with data pro-
tection in mind.21 Provisions in the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), such as Article 32, mandate the use of or-
ganisational and technical measures to create more secure
systems that address risks to rights and freedoms of individu-
als.22 Concurrently, there has been significant interest in PIMS
from EU Data Protection Compliance bodies, such as the Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor, as they enable greater con-
trol over personal data, and put the user at the centre of deci-
sions around processing.23 Databox, as a specific PIMS, is de-
fined “as a protective container for personal data where data
may actually be located in different geographical locations.
However, the Databox will act as a virtual boundary (or as a
gatekeeper) where it controls how, when, what data is shared16 He Li, Kaoru Ota and Mianxiong Dong, ‘Learning IoT in Edge: 
Deep Learning for the Internet of Things with Edge Computing’ 
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)] 32 IEEE 
Network 96 
17 UK Parliament, ‘Edge Computing, Postnote 631’ (2020) < https: 
//post.parliament.uk/research- briefings/post- pn- 0631/ > accessed 
17 December 2020 
18 EDPS, ‘Opinion on Personal Information Management Sys- 
tems’ (2016) < https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/ 
16- 10- 20 _ pims _ opinion _ en.pdf> accessed 17 December 2020 
19 Lachlan Urquhart and Jiahong Chen, ‘On the Principle of Ac- 
countability: Challenges for Smart Homes & Cybersecurity’ arXiv 
pre-print server 
20 H. Haddadi and others, ‘Databox’ (2020) < https://github.com/ 
me-box/databox/blob/master/README.md > accessed 17 July 2020 
21 L. Urquhart, A. Crabtree and T. Lodge, ‘Demonstrably Doing Ac- 
countability in the Internet of Things’ (2018) 27 International Jour- 
nal of Law and Information Technology 1 
22 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Move- 
ment of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1 
23 EDPS, ‘Opinion 9/2016 on Personal Information Manage- 
ment Systems’ (2016) < https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/ 
our- work/publications/opinions/personal- information- 















with external parties” .24 In conjunction with DADA, this can
attempt to prevent impacts of cybercrimes and data breaches
in homes. We will return to this later. 
To illustrate, further explain and justify our argument, we
have used case studies and used the lens of routine activ-
ity theory (RAT) in order to unpack how cybercrimes occur,
and what edge approaches might offer to ensure more se-
cure systems are built. According to RAT, a criminal act occurs
upon the condition of convergence in time and space of “mo-
tivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable
guardians” .25 In current IoT architectures, there is a lack of
capable guardian, and the devices remain suitable targets as
they have poor security. Edge based security analytics can help
address those. 
After presenting the background of the problem related to
harms arising in insecure smart homes (both internal and ex-
ternal) (2), we will discuss the importance of standards, the
assumptions upon which they are based, and how the edge
computing Databox model (instead of centralised cloud archi-
tectures) could be an effective solution to the issues identi-
fied above (3). Case studies and the RAT approach will be used
to further analyse how Databox and standards could have
helped in preventing security breaches, as ‘capable guardians’
(4). Finally, we will identify any remaining gaps and give po-
tential directions for future research (5). 
2. The insecurity of smart homes and routine 
activity theory 
A smart home can be described as “a contemporary applica-
tion of ubiquitous computing that incorporates intelligence
into dwellings management for comfort, healthcare, safety,
security, and energy conservation” .26 Among smart home
technologies, we find monitors, sensors, appliances, devices
and interfaces all present on the same network to allow for
automation and control of home technologies locally or re-
motely.27 A smart home device is truly smart “when all data
about the environment is collectively stored and analysed,
patterns extracted, and decisions made without the user’s in-
tervention” .28 Any device could potentially be smart. Perhaps
one of the most well-known examples are smart TVs but peo-
ple can also buy smart washing machines, fridges, kettles,
doors, thermostats, speakers, lighting or IP cameras. The vi-
sion of these devices is to make people’s lives more efficient,
convenient and safer. The dominant technical architecture to
provide a cheaper IoT device in situ is for personal data to be
gathered, sent to the cloud to be analysed remotely, and then24 Charith. A Perera and others, ‘Valorising the IoT Databox: Cre- 
ating Value for Everyone’ (2016) 28 Trans Emerging Telecommuni- 
cations Technologies 
25 Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson, ‘Social Change and 
Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach’ (1979) 44 Ameri- 
can Sociological Review 588 
26 D. Mocrii, Y. Chen and P. Musilek, ‘IoT-Based Smart Homes: A 
Review of System Architecture, Software, Communications, Pri- 
vacy and Security’ (2018) 1-2 Internet of Things 81 
27 D. J. Cook, ‘How Smart is your Home?’ (2012) 335 [6076] Science 
1579 
28 Mocrii, Chen and Musilek 






















































































35 Scott R. Peppet, ‘Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent’ 
(2014) 93 Texas Law Review 85 
36 Kayleen Manwaring, ‘Emerging Information Technologies: 
Challenges for Consumers’ (2017) 17 Oxford University Common- 
wealth Law Journal 265 
37 R. Anderson, E. Leverett and R. Clayton, ‘Standardisation and 
Certification of the ‘Internet of Things’’ (16th Annual Workshop 
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2017), California, esults are fed back to the device to enable the service to be 
elivered in the home. For example, the computation of data 
athered and sent by sleep robots to the cloud can be used 
o identify sleeping patterns and habits, and smart speakers 
an inform about various personal preferences and voice pat- 
erns of individuals.29 Often devices do not function without 
nternet connectivity (a security threat in itself, for say a smart 
ock). 
Ordinary users are often unaware of the dangers created by 
he devices they use, not to mention the lack of technical ca- 
acities to set up a secure smart home system.30 They often 
xperience difficulties both with network management and 
evices management. For this reason, smart homes should 
e given particular attention by policy makers and those de- 
igning IoT products. Citizens will only be able to success- 
ully manage their networks (and their devices) if they are 
upported by technology that makes this easy for them.31 If 
uch home network management systems do not exist, the 
isks associated with using smart home devices will be higher 
han the benefits they provide. In this context, the “Home- 
ork” project studied the future of home network manage- 
ent through the lens of the needs of the user.32 Various re- 
earch traditions were brought together to create new, more 
ser-centred approaches to the use and management of the 
ome networking infrastructure. As a consequence, proto- 
ols, architectures and models of the in-home setting were re- 
nvented. This kind of work is crucial to raise awareness and 
upport citizens living in smart homes.33 
IoT standards have been published recently, but arguably,
urrent standards mainly present best practice requirements 
f what should have been done from the beginning. Threats 
elated to smart home devices are not new and some are 
ell-known for many years. To give an example, back in 2014,
he Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (former EU data 
rotection advisory body, now the European Data Protection 
oard) identified several threats to the security of our personal 
ata linked to IoT devices. These include users becoming in- 
reasingly monitored by third parties and losing control over 
he use of their data. There are risks associated with changing 
he original purpose of processing users’ data as well as pro- 
ling people and receiving knowledge about their behaviour 
atterns. It is also much more difficult for owners of smart 
ome devices to remain anonymous even if they want to.34 
Smart homes lead to many security threats if smart devices 
re not made and deployed correctly. Peppett, for example, ar- 
ued that the propensity of security issues with IoT is partly 29 L. Urquhart, H. Schnädelbach and N. Jäger, ‘Adapti v e Architec- 
ure: Regulating Human Building Interaction’ (2019) 33 Interna- 
ional Review of Law, Computers & Technology 3 
30 K. Heuvel, ‘Securing the Smart Home’ (Masters thesis, Univer- 
ity of Amsterdam 2018) 
31 A. Adams and M. A. Sasse, ‘Users are Not the Enemy’ (1999) 42 
ommun Acm 40 
32 Homework, ‘Homework User-Centred Home Networking’ 
2012) < http://homenetworks.ac.uk/ > accessed 7 January 2021 
33 Ibid 
34 WP29, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the 
nternet of Things’ (2014) < https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/ 
ocumentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp223 _ en. 











ue to non IT manufacturers building these systems and lack- 
ng familiarity with security issues; and difficulties of patching 
oT devices in the wild.35 In response to these, Manwaring has 
rgued that we need to look beyond privacy frameworks and 
onsider liability and safety to help manage security issues of 
oT.36 This is echoed by Anderson et al., who argue the need 
or finding practical mechanisms for integrating safety engi- 
eering practices with security engineering for the IoT.37 Sim- 
larly, Rosner and Keneally state that there is a lacking incen- 
ive structure for manufacturers to invest in security, due to 
he low cost/profit margin of devices.38 Singh has argued use 
f cloud for IoT raises security concerns in relation to chain 
f responsibility, particularly who is legally meant to imple- 
ent security mechanisms and the enforcement of liability 
echanisms or notification processes when things go wrong 
.g. data breaches.39 
There are both situational and informational harms this 
ype of technology could lead to.40 Cybercriminals are con- 
tantly inventing new ways to overcome security barriers. In 
018, various malicious actions were undertaken by botnets 
such as Darkai and AESDDoS) .41 This resulted in an increase 
f the number and impact of DDoS attacks during the first 
uarter of 2018 even though preventive measures following 
revious attacks have been taken.42 The cyberthreat land- 
cape is currently wide and there are many other concerns 
uch as the more recent cryptojacking or more traditional (but 
revalent) malware campaigns.43 This highlights how current 
rchitectures and standards need to do more to respond ef- 
ectively to IoT threats as the latter keep materialising. 
As we have mentioned in the introduction, there are also 
hreats related to the fact that smart homes are not always 
afe spaces. A project conducted over a 7 years long period 
nalysed over 2000 American families to learn more about 
iolent behaviour within the family. The study showed that 
omes can be unsafe spaces, in particular for people who are une 2017) 
38 G. Rosner and E. Kenneally, ‘Clearly Opaque: Privacy Risks of 
he Internet of Things’ SSRN Electronic Journal 
39 Jatinder Singh and others, ‘Twenty Security Considerations for 
loud-Supported Internet of Things’ (2016) 3 Ieee Internet Things 
69 
40 B. Schneier, Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a 
yper-Connected World (Norton 2018) 
41 A. Rayome, ‘Major DDoS Attack Lasts 297 Hours, as Botnets 
ombard Businesses’ (2018) < https://www.techrepublic.com/ 
rticle/major- ddos- attack- lasts- 297- hours- as- botnets- bombard- 
usinesses/ > 
42 ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape 2018’ (2019) < https://www.enisa. 
uropa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2018 > ac- 
essed 12 May 2020 
43 Ibid 































































traditionally marginalised or considered to be at risk.44 The
latter are often reticent to take part in research related to con-
nected devices, which makes manufacturers and the research
community not aware of the harms those devices can cause
when they end up being controlled by the wrong person.45
Furthermore, those who share access to devices may also be
a threat to others in the home,46 an issue compounded by
shared device or family accounts.47 
Since ordinary devices have become connected to the Inter-
net, regulators need to think about security as well as safety
as harms are now physical, as well as informational.48 Whilst
a standardised reference architecture allowing for personal
data to be stored safely and securely is needed,49 despite
various reference architectures advanced to enable industry
wide standardisation for IoT security, none have been widely
adopted yet.50 
outine activity theory 
In Section 4 , we use a criminological concept, the routine ac-
tivity theory (RAT), to analyse what kind of technical archi-
tecture and what kind of standards are the most effective in
terms of protecting users of smart home devices against hu-
man and technical external threats as well as internal tech-
nical threats. To do so, we will use case studies, including the
Mirai Botnet and Hello Barbie doll examples. 
RAT was developed to analyse trends and cycles in criminal
activities more effectively. Instead of focusing on the charac-
teristics of those committing the crimes, this approach con-
centrates on the circumstances in which the criminal acts
have been executed. According to the routine activity theory, a
criminal act needs the convergence in time and space of three
factors : “motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence
of capable guardians” .51 Capable guardianship concerns “the
capability of persons and objects to prevent crime from occur-
ring” .52 This can be achieved either through “their physical44 M. Straus, R. Gelles and S. Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors Violence 
in the American Family (1 edn, Routledge 2017) 
45 S. Zheng and others, ‘User Perceptions of Smart Home IoT Pri- 
vacy’ (2018) 2 Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Inter- 
action 1 
46 D. Freed and others, ‘“A Stalker’s Paradise”: How Intimate Part- 
ner Abusers Exploit Technology’ (CHI ’18: Proceedings of the 2018 
CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Mon- 
treal, April 2018) 
47 M. Goulden, ‘“Delete the Family”: Platform Families and the 
Colonisation of the Smart Home’ [2019] Information, Communi- 
cation & Society 1 
48 R. Anderson, E. Leverett and R. Clayton, ‘Standardisation and 
Certification of the Internet of Things’ (16th Annual Workshop on 
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2017), La Jolla, Cali- 
fornia, June 2017) 
49 Mocrii, Chen and Musilek 
50 B. Di Martino and others, ‘Internet of Things Reference Archi- 
tectures, Security and Interoperability: A Survey’ (2018) 1-2 Inter- 
net of Things 99 
51 Cohen and Felson 
52 A. Tseloni and others, ‘Burglary Victimization in England and 
Wales, the United States and the Netherlands: A Cross-National 
Comparative Test of Routine Activities and Lifestyle Theories’ 








presence alone or by some form of direct action” .53 Direct in-
tervention is not necessary as routine activity theorists “see
the simple presence of a guardian in proximity to the poten-
tial target as a crucial deterrent” .54 The absence of any of the
RAT conditions is enough to prevent crimes from happening.
If there is convergence in space and time of these factors, this
can cause crime rates to rise without any kind of modifica-
tion in the structural conditions that drive people to commit
crimes.55 
Most discussions on whether criminological theories de-
veloped for the “real” world can be applied to the “virtual” one
has focused on RAT.56 There are various reasons for this. RAT
is a well-known, effective and widely used theory to examine
different forms of criminal behaviour.57 RAT is also quite intu-
itive and easy to apply in different scenarios, giving clear focal
points for effective policy making and crime prevention strate-
gies. Situational crime prevention strategies are often the re-
sult of RAT analysis,58 where design decisions are taken about
an environment to try and mitigate opportunities for crime.
It can be criticised for not really engaging with the causes of
crime, but for our purposes of understanding how to build
more secure information systems, it helps to contextualise
the threat landscape and the human factor in cybersecurity
management. In particular, as it is difficult to know the moti-
vations of the cyber offender, it can be assumed they will be
motivated, and instead we can consider the suitability of tar-
gets and absence of capable guardians to mitigate. In the IoT
domain, the insecurity of devices and lack of design guidance
certainly feeds into the pool of suitable targets. Similarly, the
poor organisational and technical practices of IoT vendors and
service providers, coupled with opacity of device functional-
ity limiting oversight by end users, means there are often no
capable guardians. 
3. IoT cybersecurity standards and from the 
cloud to the edge? 
Firstly, we will briefly discuss the nature of current smart
home cybersecurity standards (3.1) and explain why stan-
dards are important as well as their relationship with law (3.2).
We will then challenge the assumption about cloud-based ar-
chitectures for IoT products and services and explain why we
advocate for standards to reflect edge computing approaches
(3.3). Thirdly, we will discuss the thirteen principles derived53 L. E. Cohen, M. Felson and K. C. Land, ‘Property Crime Rates in 
the United States: A Macrodynamic Analysis, 1947-1977; With Ex 
Ante Forecasts for the Mid-1980s’ (1980) 86 American Journal of 
Sociology 90 
54 M. Yar, ‘The Novelty of ‘Cybercrime’: An Assessment in Light of 
Routine Activity Theory’ (2005) 2 European Journal of Criminology 
407 
55 Cohen and Felson 
56 E. R. Leukfeldt and M. Yar, ‘Applying Routine Activity Theory to 
Cybercrime: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (2016) 37 De- 
viant Behavior 263 
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65 N. Gleeson and I. Walden, ‘’It’s a Jungle Out There’?: Cloud Com- 
puting, Standards and the Law’ (2014) 5 European Journal of Law rom the mapping of cybersecurity standards done by various 
rganisations (3.4). Finally, we will raise awareness about the 
act that standards do not take into consideration internal hu- 
an threats (3.5). 
.1. Overview of the sources of standards applicable to 
mart homes 
here is a wide array of organisations developing standards 
t international (ISO, ITU etc.), regional (ETSI etc.) and national 
evels (for example, the US National Institute of Standards and 
echnology) in addition to private sector organisations and 
overnments. In our paper we have concentrated on the map- 
ing of consumer IoT cybersecurity standards done by the UK 
overnment and EU organisations. 
The UK Government’s Department for Digital, Culture, Me- 
ia and Sport’s (DCMS) “Code of Practice for Consumer Inter- 
et of Things (IoT) Security”59 and the associated “Mapping 
f IoT security recommendations, guidance and standards to 
he UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security”60 offer an 
verview of what the UK government considers as the most 
mportant security issues and how they can be addressed in 
he context of consumer IoT. The DCMS’s documents have 
een one of the main sources of information in our work. At 
he moment, the Code of Practice is voluntary but the Gov- 
rnment is considering making some of its elements legally 
nforceable in the future.61 
We also draw on the 2018 ENISA’s “IoT Security Standards 
ap Analysis, Mapping of existing standards against require- 
ents on security and privacy in the area of IoT” .62 ENISA 
as an EU agency, now rebranded as EU Agency for Cybersecu- 
ity. The DCMS and ENISA have mapped standards from differ- 
nt sources. For example, ENISA has included standards of the 
nternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) whereas 
he DCMS has omitted to do so. 
The European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the 
uropean Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards 
nstitute (ETSI) are the main European Standardization Orga- 
izations at the EU level, working together on issues of mutual 
nterest (as coordinated by the Joint Presidents’ Group (JPG)).
n 2020, ETSI updated its first globally applicable standard for 
oT cybersecurity after the European Commission tasked ETSI 
o produce this document 63 .64 This standard has taken into 59 DCMS, ‘Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security’ 
60 DCMS, ‘Mapping of IoT Security Recommendations, Guidance 
nd Standards to the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Se- 
urity’ 
61 T. Reeve, ‘Government Could Regulate IoT Security as it 
aunches Industry Code of Practice’ ( SC Media , 2018) < https: 
/www.scmagazineuk.com/government-regulate-iot-security- 
aunches- industry- code- practice/article/1496163 > accessed 12 
ay 2020 
62 ENISA, ‘IoT Security Standards Gap Analysis’ 
63 ETSI, ‘ETSI Releases First Globally Applicable Stan- 
ard for Consumer IoT Security ’ (2019) < https://www.etsi. 
rg/newsroom/press-releases/1549-2019-02-etsi-releases- 
rst- globally- applicable- standard- for- consumer- iot- security > 
ccessed 12 May 2020 
64 ETSI, ‘EN 303 645 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of 











ccount all major documents related to consumer security in 
he IoT field including the DCMS and ENISA reports mentioned 
reviously. ETSI’s work has been the main source of our anal- 
sis. 
.2. The importance of standards and their interaction 
ith law 
tandards can be applied in a voluntary way. Compliance with 
tandards is frequently treated as proof of due diligence and 
est practice in a particular industry.65 This is in itself an in- 
entive for organisations to respect standards and there is an 
rgument that those following standards might be more re- 
iable and reputable.66 For example, the company LIMS which 
pecialises in software to manage laboratory testing promotes 
n its website the fact that it complies with ISO 27001 stan- 
ards concerning safety and security.67 
Standards can also be negotiated or imposed on actors 
n the field of IoT by legal private and public mechanisms.68 
ublic law can impose standards through legal requirements 
r guidance on how to apply those requirements. Govern- 
ents often use standards to write legislation and best prac- 
ice guides (at the EU level, the European Commission has 
ven published a guide on how to reference standards in leg- 
slation and it has done so in many EU laws) .69 Compliance 
ith standards can help an organisation in proving that it also 
omplies with laws.70 If they are violated, this might result in 
dministrative or criminal sanctions. In private law, standards 
re often negotiated and enforced through contracts.71 
Standards can be divided into three main categories.72 
echnical standards provide details “of a format, protocol, or 
nterface and describe how to make things work in an interop- 
rable manner” .73 They are usually written by industry actors 
nd, as a result, are more often under the umbrella of = pri-
ate law. Their influence on the way organisations and people 
ehave may be as important as other types of laws and reg- 
lations.74 Informational standards “set parameters for types 
f information to be communicated about a product, such as nd Technology 
66 BSI, ‘Standards and Regulation’ (2019) < https://www.bsigroup. 
om/en- GB/standards/Information- about- standards/standards- 
nd-regulation/ > accessed 12 May 2020 
67 D. Colantuono, ‘We are ISO 27001 Certified!’ ( EUSoft , 2019) 
 https://www.eusoft.co.uk/we- are- iso- 27001- certified/ > ac- 
essed 12 May 2020 
68 Gleeson and Walden 
69 European Commission, ‘Methods of Referencing Standards 
n Legislation with an Emphasis on European Legislation’ (2002) 
 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/methods-referencing- 
tandards- legislation- emphasis- european- legislation 
0 _ en > accessed 18 July 2020 
70 Gleeson and Walden 
71 Ibid 
72 Ibid 
73 N. Borenstein and J. Blake, ‘Cloud Computing Standards: 
here’s the Beef?’ (2011) 15 Ieee Internet Comput 74 
74 Gleeson and Walden 



























































labelling standards” .75 Evaluative standards “test and certify
the proper use of best-known practices” .76 Evaluative and in-
formational standards usually influence a higher number of
stakeholders, including lawmakers and regulators.77 
Certification procedures are also proof of the significance
of standards, both for consumers and manufacturers of smart
home devices. Certification serves often to determine com-
pliance with a set of standards. It can be defined as “confor-
mity assessment” during which “a person or a body will eval-
uate compliance of persons, products and/or processes with
a given set of requirements” .78 Concerning evaluative stan-
dards which demonstrate that particular levels of security or
quality have been achieved, certification procedures include
an objective evaluation of compliance by third parties.79 These
procedures increase trust among smart home devices buyers
as it proves to them that the product respects certain stan-
dards .80 
This is another reason why adopting effective standards
is crucial. The buyers of smart home devices could be influ-
enced by certification schemes such as the recently published
Kitemark for IoT devices and some of them might think that in
the presence of this Kitemark, they do not have to worry about
security or safety risks.81 Indeed, “Standards and certificates
can be a synonym of reliability and assurance to the end user
and citizen” .82 Recently, the government has started working
on a new labelling scheme for consumer IoT product security,
which could have a strong impact on the IoT sector.83 
Notwithstanding all the benefits and significance of stan-
dards, there are issues around them that all stakeholders
should strive to overcome. Firstly, standards are not developed
fast enough and are written in a way that does not allow to
successfully respond to threat levels.84 Sometimes, there is
also a lack of awareness about the existence of certain stan-
dards among various stakeholders such as small and medium75 OECD, ‘OECD Policy Roundtable on Standard-Setting’ ( OECD , 
2010) < http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/47381304.pdf> ac- 
cessed 12 May 2020 
76 Borenstein and Blake 
77 Gleeson and Walden 
78 ENISA, ‘Security Certification Practice in the EU’ (2013) < https: 
//www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/security-certification- 
practice- in- the- eu- information- security- management- systems- 
a- case- study > accessed 27 October 2020 
79 Gleeson and Walden 
80 I. Kamara, T. Sveinsdottir and S. Wurster, ‘Raising Trust in Se- 
curity Products and Systems through Standardisation and Certifi- 
cation: The Crisp Approach’ (2015 ITU Kaleidoscope: Trust in the 
Information Society (K-2015), Barcelona, December 2015) 
81 BSI, ‘BSI Launches Kitemark for Internet of Things De- 
vices’ (2018) < https://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/about-bsi/ 
media-centre/press-releases/2018/may/bsi-launches-kitemark- 
for- internet- of- things- devices/ > accessed 12 May 2020 
82 Kamara, Sveinsdottir and Wurster 
83 DCMS, ‘Consultation on the Government’s Regulatory Pro- 
posals regarding Consumer Internet of Things (IoT) Secu- 
rity’ (2020) < https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ 
consultation- on- regulatory-proposals-on-consumer-iot-security/ 
consultation- on- the- governments- regulatory- proposals- regarding- 
consumer- internet- of- things- iot- security > accessed 27 October 
2020 













enterprises or public authorities.85 Finally, standards develop-
ment organisations are not communicating with each other
effectively about their work which leads to a multiplication of
standards on particular topics and a shortage of standards on
others.86 
In our paper, we argue that due to assumptions about the
widely adopted cloud architecture model, the nature of the
current standards does not guarantee the security and safety
of smart home environments, although they are a step in the
right direction. Lessig drew attention to regulation through
code, and that the design and architecture of technologies are
regulatory tools that can enforce certain norms. As a conse-
quence, adopting the right standards and architecture is im-
portant because they influence how people behave and how
they can interact with their smart devices.87 As Reidenberg
affirmed back in 1997, standards organisations, part of “the
technical community, willingly or not, now” have “become a
policy community, and with policy influence comes public re-
sponsibility” .88 More than 20 years on, we are still attempting
to parse what this role for designers looks like in practice. 
3.3. The choice of a cloud architecture and the edge 
computing databox alternative 
Back in 2012, one of European Commission’s concerns was in-
sufficient standards written in the field of IoT data protec-
tion and security.89 The Commission referred only to cloud-
based services. It has called for “publicly available cloud offer-
ings ("public cloud") that meet European standards” .90 Since
then, an impressive number of standards have been developed
to support such services. The way the ETSI standard as well
as standards mapped by ENISA and the DCMS are currently
written, they are making assumptions about the design of
IoT products and services, and rather predictable statements
(such as the no default passwords requirement). They seem
to accept as a necessity that data is removed from the de-
vice and stored in the cloud. Citizens’ data is currently mined
and stored in databases. Indeed, when thinking about IoT,
we usually think of goods that send data to the cloud.91 The
current trends in computing are reflected in smart homes,
“particularly big data, cloud computing and machine learning,
with personal data collected by IoT devices typically being dis-
tributed to the cloud for processing and analytics” .92 There is
no inherent need to design IoT devices using cloud infrastruc-85 Ibid 
86 Ibid 
87 L. Lawrence, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) 
88 R. J. Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Informa- 
tion Policy Rules through Technology’ (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 
553 
89 European Commission, ‘Unleashing the Potential of Cloud 
Computing in Europe COM (2012)’ (2012) < https://eur-lex.europa. 
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF > 
accessed 12 May 2020 
90 Ibid 
91 M. Hung, ‘Leading the IoT: Gartner Insights on How to Lead 
in a Connected World’ ( Gartner , 2017) < https://www.gartner. 
com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook _ digital.pdf> accessed 27 Octo- 
ber 2020 
92 Urquhart, Crabtree and Lodge 


































































































ures - this is a design choice, one that may have cost-based 
ustifications but also enables the data harvesting infrastruc- 
ure that underpins many IoT business models. Why do we ad- 
ocate for an edge computing solution that goes against cur- 
ent cloud-based trends? 
Firstly, from a GDPR perspective, international data trans- 
ers to third countries where remote servers are based make 
ompliance difficult. Third countries may not always have 
een deemed adequate for EU citizens data to be stored there,
nd thus once data travels abroad, it can be harder to control 
ho has access to it and where this data actually is located 
in this context, access by foreign law enforcement to sensitive 
ata from other countries which is now located on its territory 
aises important concerns). In this situation, adequate protec- 
ion of data is difficult to be achieved.93 Local storage seems 
 better answer for companies (less issues with compliance),
onsumers (safer and more secure treatment of their personal 
ata) and the smart home IoT sector in general (increased con- 
umers’ trust that their data is protected). 
If data processing takes place on the edge of the network 
nstead of centralized processing taking place in the cloud,
his could not only diminish but also completely discard the 
eed to distribute personal data and the privacy dangers that 
re linked to this distribution.94 Edge computing can reduce 
o the minimum the amount of data that is distributed (only 
he necessary data to respond to a certain issue or query is 
eing sent to external actors). Advances in federated learn- 
ng mean it can be possible to do distributed data analytics 
n more privacy preserving ways.95 As opposed to more com- 
on machine learning that uses centralized approaches, “fed- 
rated learning is a decentralized training approach”, that en- 
bles devices “located at different geographical locations to 
ollaboratively learn a machine learning model while keeping 
ll the personal data that may contain private information on 
he device” .96 This is more consistent with the data minimi- 
ation principle (article 5 GDPR). Moreover, there are other ad- 
antages when data processing takes place at the edge such 
s reduced latency issues (there is no necessity for the data 
o travel between the home and remote data centres), im- 
roved resilience related to actuation (actuation is not depen- 
ent upon uninterrupted connectivity) and diminished costs 
f data processing.97 As we can see, if the computation of data 
akes place at the network’s edge, this can have potentially 
any advantages over the currently predominant cloud archi- 
ectures, including more oversight for security and privacy of 
ata. 
The Databox is an example of an edge computing ap- 
roach, a personal information management system (PIMS).
t has been developed with smart homes in mind, where the 93 Ibid 
94 A. Crabtree and others, ‘Building Accountability into the Inter- 
et of Things: the IoT Databox Model’ (2018) 4 Journal of Reliable 
ntelligent Environments 39 
95 C. Troncoso and others, ‘Systematizing Decentralization and 
rivacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments’ 
2017) 4 Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
96 Z. Li, V. Sharma and S. P. Mohanty, ‘Preserving Data Privacy via 
ederated Learning: Challenges and Solutions’ (2020) 9 Ieee Con- 
um Electr M 8 








bjective is to “transform the current provider centric system 
nto a human centric system where individuals are protected 
gainst unlawful processing of their data and against intru- 
ive tracking and profiling techniques that aim at circumvent- 
ng key data protection principles” .98 Databox stores data lo- 
ally and keeps information close to the owners of IoT smart 
ome devices which allows the end user to have more con- 
rol over data, and for the creation of a more user centric and
thical architecture for future IoT products.99 Databox wants 
o give people back control over their information. It collects 
ata from smart home devices, “either directly or via APIs,
nd makes them available to apps that enable data processing 
nd actuation” .100 In the Databox model, smart home devices 
ll feed into the box and raw data never leaves the latter. All
he externals actors can receive is the result of the analysis 
erformed to answer particular queries.101 Moreover, Databox 
an enable new and more effective types of threat manage- 
ent. It spots security threats on the home network and once 
t spots them, it informs users that devices are being used in 
ays that are not expected (by drawing on Manufacturer Us- 
ge Description profiles of expected behaviour) .102 This way,
atabox allows for potentially faster and more effective threat 
anagement. 
.4. The thirteen principles derived from current 
tandards 
s we have seen, data from IoT devices is usually distributed 
o the cloud and standards are being written based on those 
loud-based architectures. Even though they have mapped 
nd analysed standards created by different organisations,
NISA and the DCMS have arrived at the exact same thir- 
een principles derived from those standards. This shows that 
here is a trend related to how standards are being written at 
he moment. This is not negative in itself as the standards de- 
eloped for cloud-based architectures are often quite obvious 
equirements of what should have been done from the begin- 
ing and should exist (for example, ensuring that the software 
s regularly updated or that there are no default passwords).
any of them would be also relevant and important for edge 
omputing architectures. Furthermore, as a lot of IoT devices 
urrently do rely on cloud, these standards are not wrong to 
ocus on this design. However, as standards, they can set di- 
ection of travel for best practice, and thus should be more 
spirational in trying to change industry practice (which is in 
onjunction with legal requirements to do so anyway). 
The DCMS and ETSI described the following thirteen guide- 
ines as necessary to protect citizens’ safety and privacy: 
1 Lack of a default password, 98 EDPS, ‘Opinion 9/2016 on Personal Information Management 
ystems’ 
99 Urquhart, Crabtree and Lodge 
00 Crabtree and others 
01 Urquhart, Crabtree and Lodge 
02 A. Hamza and others, ‘Clear as MUD: Generating, Validating 
nd Applying IoT Behavioral Profiles’ (Publication: IoT S&P ’18: Pro- 
eedings of the 2018 Workshop on IoT Security and Privacy, Bu- 
apest, August 2018) 














































































2 Vulnerability disclosures, 
3 Support for the whole lifecycle of IoT products, 
4 Secure storage of sensitive data, 
5 Secure communications, 
6 The application of the least privilege principle (minimising
exposed attack surfaces, for example, by closing all unused
software and network ports), 
7 Maintenance of the integrity of the software, 
8 Protection of personal data, 
9 Resilience of systems to outages, 
0 Monitoring telemetry data (examining data automatically
transferred by users’ devices to an IT system in a separate
location for security evaluation and quick mitigation of po-
tential issues), 
1 Facilitating the removal of personal data, 
2 Easy configuration of the devices and 
3 Validating the data input. 
How do different stakeholders perceive those principles?
We will take the lack of a default password requirement
as an example. The Internet Society’s Online Trust Alliance
(an American NGO) considers that companies should “in-
clude strong authentication by default, including providing
unique, system-generated or single use passwords; or alter-
natively use secure certificate credentials” .103 A formal stan-
dardization body, the ISO, demands in its standard 27002 to
“ensure that default passwords and even default usernames
are changed during the initial setup, and that weak, null or
blank passwords are not allowed” .104 In its standard ISO/IEC
19,790 it states that “authentication mechanisms must use
strong passwords or personal identification numbers (PINs),
and should consider using two-factor authentication (2FA) or
multi-factor authentication (MFA) like Smartphones, Biomet-
rics, etc., on top of certificates” .105 Similarly, the multinational
conglomerate AT&T considers that “rather than permitting an
easy-to-hack default password, each device should require the
user to define a unique and reasonably secure password for
access from a network interface” and according to the GSMA
trade body “it is imperative that all authentication systems en-
force strong passwords where passwords are required for user
authentication”106 .107 As we can see, NGOs, governmental ac-
tors and companies share a similar view and this is not sur-
prising as a standard requiring to set unique passwords seems
to be an obvious recommendation, beneficial to all stakehold-03 OTA, ‘IoT Trust by Framework’ (2017) < https://www. 
internetsociety.org/iot/trust-framework/ > accessed 6 May 2020 
04 ISO, ‘ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information Technology - Security 
Techniques - Code of Practice for Information Security Con- 
trols’ (2013) < https://www.iso.org/standard/54533.html > accessed 
12 May 2020 
05 ISO, ‘ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Information Technology - Security 
Techniques - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules’ 
(2012) < https://www.iso.org/standard/52906.html > accessed 12 
May 2020 
06 GSMA, ‘IoT Security Guidelines for IoT Service Ecosystem’ 
(2017) < https://www.gsma.com/iot/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ 
CLP.12-v2.0.pdf> accessed 5 April 2020 
07 AT&T, ‘Exploring IoT Security’ ( AT&T , 2016) < https: 
//www.business.att.com/content/dam/attbusiness/reports/ 








ers. Similarly, principles such as the one stating that personal
data needs to be protected or that support should be given
during the whole lifecycle of products (and all of the others
principles actually) would help, if effectively implemented, in
protecting users of smart home devices and in ensuring that
organisations comply with regulations. 
However, those principles will be more easily applied
in practice using the Databox architecture (please see
Section 3.3 for arguments in favour of edge computing). We
can take the example of the principle that calls for making
systems resilient to outages. Provision 5.9–1 of the ETSI stan-
dard states that “resilience should be built into IoT devices
and services where required by their usage or by other rely-
ing systems, taking into account the possibility of outages of
data networks and power” .108 As we have seen in a previous
section, this is clearly easier in the Databox scenario where ac-
tuation is not dependent on uninterrupted connectivity. This
could prevent situations such as the Google Nest outage from
May 2018 when smart security cameras, smart thermostats
and smart locks were all affected.109 Because edge comput-
ing solutions such as Databox are safer methods of storing
and processing users’ data, this means that such architectures
could be more efficient in successfully implementing the thir-
teen principles derived from current cybersecurity standards
presented above. Moreover, if new standards based specifically
on this edge computing approach would be written, this could
potentially add additional safety layers to this already safer
architectural model. 
3.5. Addressing the standards gap for human threats 
using rat 
In addition to the above, cybersecurity standards also assume
that homes are safe spaces and that the network manager is
a good person. They do not consider the problems of in-home
human threats (which do exist as we have seen in the intro-
duction and Section 2 ). We can take domestic abuse as exam-
ple. This problem has been recently discussed in an interest-
ing article. In June 2018, the New York Times warned about
the rising number of smart home devices in cases of domestic
abuse.110 The author shows that IoT products can lead to an
imbalance of power within homes. She describes how people
called hotlines extremely worried about what was happening.
A woman called informing that the code numbers of the lock
at her house door changed each day and that she did not know
why. Another person complained that she continued to hear
the sound of the doorbell ringing, however there was no one at
the door. These are examples of new forms of domestic abuse08 ETSI, ‘TS 103 645 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet 
of Things’ (2019) < https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi _ ts/103600 _ 
103699/103645/01.01.01 _ 60/ts _ 103645v010101p.pdf> accessed 12 
May 2020 
09 The Register, ‘Three-Hour Outage Renders Nest-Equipped 
Smart Homes Very Dumb’ (2018) < https://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2018/05/17/nest _ outage/ > accessed 12 May 2020 
10 N. Bowles, ‘Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Dig- 
ital Tools of Domestic Abuse’ ( The New York Times , 
2018) < https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/ 
smart- home- devices- domestic- abuse.html > accessed 12 May 
2020 
10 computer law & security review 42 (2021) 105542 



















































































hrough harassment, monitoring etc. Bad actors remotely con- 
rol connected devices to abuse their victims. Problems are 
orsened when other members of the household know lit- 
le about the workings of smart homes and how to make 
he abuser legally and practically stop his criminal behaviour.
ost often, only one person in the house installs the tech- 
ology, understands how it works and possesses all the pass- 
ords. This gives this person the power to use the technology 
or domestic abuse. The opportunities to go to court and legal 
ecourse in general can be quite limited.111 Technologies such 
s IoT devices give perpetrators new tools to harass and con- 
rol people. Women and girls continue to be the most affected 
y domestic abuse.112 Smart devices create a distinct group of 
hallenges in the field of domestic violence that are still not 
ully understood and acknowledged, and which require spe- 
ific responses.113 There are also other human threats related 
o smart homes, such as social surveillance, which should be 
nalysed and resolved as well 114 115 116 .117 Social surveillance 
an be defined as the “ongoing eavesdropping, investigation,
ossip and inquiry that constitutes information gathering by 
eople about their peers, made salient by the social digitiza- 
ion”, which could be done for malicious purposes using IoT 
roducts (just as it has been the case for many years with so- 
ial media) 118 . 
As we have mentioned previously, this paper’s objective is 
ot to find concrete solutions to the lack of standards (please 
ee Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 below) related to human threats inside 
eople’s homes. In this additional section, we would simply 
ike to raise awareness about the fact that there seems to be 
 lack of capable guardians as human threats within smart 
omes keep materialising. The RAT theory could be effective 
n analysing how the insecurity of smart devices can be ex- 
loited internally by motivated offenders against suitable tar- 
ets as well as in finding potential capable guardians. It has 11 Ibid 
12 L. Tanczer and others, ‘Gender and IoT Research Report. The 
ise of the Internet of Things and Implications for Technology- 
acilitated Abuse’ ( University College London , 2019) < https://www. 
cl.ac.uk/steapp/sites/steapp/files/giot-report.pdf> accessed 12 
ay 2020 
13 Goulden 
14 M. Goulden and others, ‘Living with Interpersonal Data: Ob- 
ervability and Accountability in the Age of Pervasive ICT’ (2018) 
0 New Media & Society 1580 
15 A. Marwick, ‘The Public Domain: Surveillance in Everyday Life’ 
2012) 9 Surveillance & Society 378 
16 M. Flintham and others, ‘Domesticating Data: Socio-Legal Per- 
pectives on Smart Homes & Good Data Design’ in A. Daly (ed), 
ood Data (SK Devitt & M Mann 2019) 

















lready been applied to analyse domestic and intimate vio- 
ence in the past.119 
In this context and concerning the relationship between 
n-home human threats, standards and architectures, the 
atabox architecture would probably not be able to act as a ca- 
able guardian here as it deals with problems related to data 
eaving the home, not to data used by its inhabitants in their 
nteractions with each other. Standards also do not provide 
ny solution at the moment. However, maybe they could be- 
ome capable guardians and prevent in-home human threats 
y limiting what the devices can or cannot do through techni- 
al guidance developed with the help of sociological research.
hey could shape design to remove affordances (“affordances 
efine what actions are possible”120 ) for human threats and 
o reduce vectors for influence and manipulation. For exam- 
le, in the context of intimate partner violence, some authors 
dvocate in favour of refining “authentication mechanisms to 
etter distinguish between legitimate users and UI-bound ad- 
ersaries” and developing new frameworks “to consider ad- 
ersarial users while designing and evaluating UIs in order to 
imit systems’ abusability” .121 Further research in this area is 
eeded in terms of how standards could offer guidance. More- 
ver, this approach has its limitations as it focuses on the sit- 
ation instead of the actual cause of crimes so it would need 
o be accompanied by other strategies to target human threats 
nside the home. This is a broad area of research in policing,
ictimology and criminology more generally and there is also 
 need to engage with wider societal aspects that lead to do- 
estic violence and other human crimes in the first place. 
To really understand in-home threats and identify capable 
uardians, ethnographic studies should be used to comple- 
ent the RAT analysis by explaining the actions and routines 
f motivated offenders. A home network is a “sociological ob- 
ect wrapped up in the organisation of” the lives of household 
embers.122 Indeed, network management is indivisibly in- 
erweaved with everyday activities that form part and orga- 
ize domestic life. As a consequence, “the developers of net- 
ork control and management facilities need to be aware of 
he impact of the social and moral ordering of domestic ac- 
ivities and the host of relationships and situated judgments 
nvolved” .123 19 Mannon 
20 D. Norman, The Design of Everyday Things (Perseus Books Group, 
013) 
21 Freed and others 
22 A. Crabtree and others, ‘Unremarkable Networking’ (Proceed- 
ngs of the Designing Interactive Systems Conference on - DIS ’12, 
ewcastle Upon Tyne, June 2012) 
23 Ibid 
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The negative consequences and trauma related to violence
in a private and trusted environment such as our home can
be much stronger than the effects of crimes which occur in
the streets or in the “more obvious” high crime places.124 It is
important to continue doing studies on the influence of IoT
devices on threats inside the home in order to identify capa-24 Mannon 1ble guardians, prevent bad actors from being able to use those
devices to commit crimes and vulnerable people from being
exposed to even greater risk.125 
In Figs. 1 and 2 below, we have used the DCMS docu-
ments, the ETSI Standard and ENISA’s reports on the cy-
berthreat landscape to find out which types of threats are25 Zheng and others 





























































































f  ackled by principles derived from standards 126 127 128 129 .130 
ig. 1 presents various technical and human smart home re- 
ated threats. 
In Fig. 2 we now look at the technical and human threats 
rom Fig. 1 in more depth to explore how they have been ad- 
ressed by principles derived from standards. We arrived at 
he conclusion that none of the 13 principles identified in the 
TSI standard, the DCMS Code of Practice and in the “Mapping 
f IoT Security Recommendations, Guidance and Standards”
ocument of the DCMS respond to in-home human threats.
he latter includes “IoT security and privacy related” stan- 
ards and recommendations developed by organisations such 
s the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), the GSMA, the Alliance 
or Internet of Things Innovation (AIOTI) and many others.131 
. Applying the rat concept to external threats 
 vulnerability of current smart home devices is that most of 
hem do not have or have only a few security features reflect- 
ng the current standards. We are a long way from the lat- 
er being widely adopted.132 It is important to consider if the 
pplication of standards based on cloud architectures could 
ave prevented security breaches from happening as well as 
hether standards combined with the Databox architecture,
ould have been more effective. To conduct our analysis, we 
ill use RAT. We will briefly discuss RAT’s theory applicabil- 
ty to cybercrime (4.1), before analysing our case studies – the 
IFI Hello Barbie Doll (4.2) and the Mirai Botnet affair (4.3). 
.1. The rat theory 
here are currently debates on whether cybercrime should be 
egarded as a new and unique category of criminal activities,
nd, as a consequence, an activity that requires the creation 
f new criminological theories and terms. RAT “has been re- 
eatedly nominated as a theory capable of adaptation to cy- 
erspace” .133 This is what we tried to achieve in our paper,
dapting and using RAT to better analyse smart home related 
ybersecurity threats.134 We agree cybercrime is a “range of il- 
icit activities whose common denominator is the central role 
layed by networks of information and communication tech- 
ology (ICT) in their commission” .135 A cybercrime can start 26 ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Smart 
ome and Converged Media’ (2014) < https://www.enisa. 
uropa.eu/publications/threat- landscape- for- smart- home- and- 
edia-convergence > accessed 12 May 2020 
27 ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape 2018’ 
28 DCMS, ‘Mapping of IoT Security Recommendations, Guidance 
nd Standards to the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Se- 
urity’ 
29 ETSI, ‘EN 303 645 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of 
hings: Baseline Requirements’ 
30 DCMS, ‘Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security’ 
31 DCMS, ‘Mapping of IoT Security Recommendations, Guidance 
nd Standards to the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Se- 
urity’ 
32 Lin and Bergmann 
33 Yar 


















n cyberspace and then continue in the “real world” based on 
he data obtained on the internet. 
In Section 2 , we have explained in more detail why we con-
ider RAT as a useful tool for our analysis. According to this 
heory, for a criminal act to exist there needs to be conver- 
ence in time and space of three factors, namely motivated of- 
enders, suitable targets and the lack of capable guardians.136 
he absence of one of them is enough to prevent crimes 
rom happening. RAT does not focus on the motivations of 
he offender and concentrates instead on the circumstances 
n which the crime has been committed.137 RAT presupposes 
hat there will always be people inclined to commit crime 
or a multitude of reasons. RAT theorists analyse “the man- 
er in which the spatio-temporal organization of social ac- 
ivities helps people to translate their criminal inclinations 
nto action” .138 Following RAT’s reasoning, there will always 
e motivated actors seeking to exploit smart homes for var- 
ous purposes. The real question is therefore how to prevent 
hem from being successful. 
There are four main properties used to analyse the suitabil- 
ty of specific targets: value, inertia, visibility and accessibility 
VIVA) .139 Even though they differ in terms of their applicabil- 
ty between “traditional” crimes and cybercrimes, they can be 
dapted to the latter.140 
In terms of a capable guardian that can defend smart home 
wellers against cyber threats, we will evaluate whether stan- 
ards and Databox could act effectively as such a guardian.
ccording to RAT, the presence of a capable guardian is the 
ost likely element to diminish victimisation.141 
Finally, it is important to remember that RAT requires the 
onvergence in time and space of the three factors described 
bove. We will evaluate in our case studies if this convergence 
appens. 
.2. The wi-fi enabled hello barbie doll, standards and the 
atabox 
n 2015, Mattel produced a Wi-Fi enabled Barbie doll. The 
ello Barbie doll was described as the first interactive doll in 
he world, able to listen to children and talk with them. The 
oll is connected to the internet through Wi-Fi. It possesses 
 microphone that records children. This data is then trans- 
erred to third-parties for processing. A security researcher,
att Jakubowski, managed to hack the doll. This permitted 
im to gain access to its system and account information, au- 
io data files and the doll’s microphone.142 
If we apply RAT here, the motivated offenders would be 
he hackers of the Barbie doll. In terms of suitable targets and 36 Cohen and Felson 
37 T. N. Fawn and R. Paternoster, ‘Cybercrime Victimization: An 
xamination of Individual and Situational Level Factors’ (2011) 5 
nternational Journal of Cyber Criminology 773 
38 Cohen and Felson 
39 Ibid 
40 Yar 
41 Leukfeldt and Yar 
42 S. Gibbs, ‘Hackers can Hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie to Spy on your 
hildren’ ( The Guardian , 2015) < https://www.theguardian.com/ 
echnology/2015/nov/26/hackers- can- hijack- wi- fi- hello- barbie- 
o- spy- on- your- children > accessed 12 May 2020 





















































































the VIVA criteria, the value of the target could be acquiring
personal sensitive information or using the doll to hack into
other devices. This could then be used for various criminal
purposes. The visibility of the target would be very high as the
doll was widely marketed. M. Jakubowski showed how easily
the doll could be hacked and accessed by cybercriminals. Fi-
nally, in terms of the inertia criteria, which can be interpreted
in cyberspace as “files and technological specifications” offer-
ing varying levels of resistance (for example, file size or lim-
itations of the tools used by the cybercriminal), it does not
seem that there was any effective inertia resistance to prevent
crimes from being successful. 
There was no capable guardian as the Barbie doll simply
lacked enough features to ensure its safety and security. Even
if used in the presence of adults, the latter would not have
been able to be capable guardians as it is difficult to consider
that they would know about the doll’s security flaws or if they
did, that they would know how to prevent threats from mate-
rialising. Similarly, the poor security practices of the doll ven-
dor suggest they are also not a capable guardian. With the
Hello Barbie doll, it is easy to envisage the convergence in time
and space of motivated offenders, suitable targets and the ab-
sence of a capable guardian. For example, the attacker could
spy through the doll’s microphone and use this opportunity to
conduct any criminal activity he could think of at the time of
his choosing, when capable guardians would not be present.
He could also use information present on the doll to take over
home Wi-Fi networks and hack into other devices. 
The Hello Barbie doll is far from being the only smart home
toy suffering from security problems. Another doll named
Cayla has been denounced by German officials as enabling
spying on families and gathering personal data.143 This doll
transferred the data it recorded to the United States. This not
only posed threats to the family’s security but was also incom-
patible with GDPR’s requirements related to the protection of
personal data, such as the ones regarding limitations of inter-
national data transfers. Moreover, in a technical analysis com-
missioned by the Norwegian Consumer Council, the study dis-
covered that anyone could access the speakers and the micro-
phone of the doll, without needing physical access to the de-
vice 144 .145 This serious security flaw resulted from the lack of
any security measures concerning Cayla’s Bluetooth connec-
tion. Anyone within approximately a 15-meter radius would
have been able to connect to the doll and use this connection
for potentially malicious purposes. 43 A. Erickson, ‘This Pretty Blond Doll Could be Spying on 
your Family’ (2017) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
worldviews/wp/2017/02/23/this- pretty- blond- doll- could- be- 
spying- on- your- family/?noredirect=on&utm _ term= 
.00adeafac872 > accessed 12 May 2020 
44 Forbrukerradet (Norwegian Consumer Council), ‘#Toyfail An 
Analysis of Consumer and Privacy Issues in Three Internet- 
Connected Toys’ (2016) < https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/12/toyfail-report-desember2016.pdf> accessed 19 
July 2020 
45 Bouvet on behalf of the Norwegian Consumer Council, ‘Inves- 
tigation of Privacy and Security Issues with Smart Toys’ (2016) 
< https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ 
2016- 11- technical- analysis- of- the- dolls- bouvet.pdf> accessed 







Both in the case of the Hello Barbie doll and Cayla, the im-
plementation of relevant standards would have helped with
ensuring that those devices are more secure and that users’
personal data is safer. Standards might have been capable
guardians against hacking the doll if implemented correctly.
In particular, a requirement such as the “no universal de-
fault passwords” ETSI standard’s requirement might have pre-
vented issues.146 This was not the case for Hello Barbie as, for
example, the mobile API and ToyTalk website allowed users
to use weak passwords, did not prevent brute force password
attacks and allowed unlimited password guesses.147 However,
even if standards were implemented, the dangers related to
storing and sending data into the cloud for processing by un-
known third parties would be still present. 
An effective implementation of standards and an edge led
approach is the safest choice for consumers. Databox would
have been able to act as a capable guardian. With Databox,
the architecture places the processing of data at the edge of
the network, in user’s home environment and “enables the
data subject to control external access to data via app mani-
fests that provide granular choice encoded as enforceable data
processing policies on-the-box, and constrains data distribu-
tion to the results of processing”. Moreover, “The IoT Databox
stores data in a distributed array of containers, which encrypt
data at rest” .148 In this kind of environment, the hacker would
have to overcome those security barriers to gain access to the
doll’s data. Children’s conversations with the doll would not
be sent to the cloud but stored locally. Finally, any unusual ac-
tivity by the doll e.g. if it was attempting to export data to a
remote server, parents would be informed through its easy to
read interface and would be able to provide consent for any
data leaving the box.149 
4.3. The mirai botnet, standards and the databox 
On the 20th of September 2016, the web page of a well-known
journalist writing about profit seeking cyber-criminals has
been taken down during one of the biggest Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks we have ever seen. This attack was
caused by what has been later identified as the Mirai botnet.
A botnet can be defined as “a group of malware infected com-
puters also called “zombies” or bots that can be used remotely
to carry out attacks against other computer systems.”150 Mirai
has been considered by some as the “beginning of a chaotic
151 and worrisome era of the Internet” . It has been seen as a 
46 ETSI, ‘EN 303 645 Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of 
Things: Baseline Requirements’ 
47 Somerset Recon, ‘Hello Barbie Initial Security Analy- 
sis’ (2018) < http://static1.squarespace.com/static/543effd8e 
4b095fba39dfe59/t/56a66d424bf1187ad34383b2/1453747529070/ 
HelloBarbieSecurityAnalysis.pdf> accessed 12 May 2020 
48 Urquhart, Crabtree and Lodge 
49 Crabtree and others 
50 OECD, ‘Malicious Software (Malware): A Security Threat to 
the Internet Economy, Ministerial Background Report DSTI/ 
ICCP/REG(2007)5/FINAL’ (2008) < https://www.oecd.org/internet/ 
ieconomy/40724457.pdf> accessed 19 July 2020 
51 J. Margolis and others, ‘An In-Depth Analysis of the Mirai Bot- 
net’ (Proceedings 2017 International Conference on Software Se- 
curity and Assurance (Icssa), Altoona, 2017) 




































































































ake-up call to include security concerns into the design and 
roduction of IoT devices. 
If we applied the RAT analysis in this context, the moti- 
ated offender would be the 3 individuals who created the Mi- 
ai botnet and the botnet itself controlled by them. Those indi- 
iduals wanted to use the botnet on people they held grudges 
gainst (the suitable targets) as well as to rent it to other moti- 
ated offenders (who could then use it against their own suit- 
ble targets) .152 The reach of the botnet was therefore wide. 
We will now apply RAT’s VIVA properties to analyse the 
uitability of targets in the Mirai case. In terms of the value 
f the suitable targets, it is difficult to provide one answer 
s there were so many motivated offenders that might have 
sed the botnet for their own specific reasons. However, the 
alue of the targets must have been high for many offend- 
rs. The creators of the botnet assigned value to the fact that 
hey could victimise people that they held grudges against as 
ell as for economic reasons while those who rented Mirai 
ight have had different ones. The variety of people the bot- 
et could affect expanded the range and importance of value 
ttached to suitable targets. Concerning targets’ visibility, any 
erson owning a smart home device could have been targeted 
y the botnet. The botnet actively scanned for vulnerable tar- 
ets, making those with weak security defence mechanisms 
in this case mainly default passwords) more accessible and 
herefore more suitable. Finally, there were no inertial proper- 
ies that could make hacks more difficult. 
There was no capable guardian as Mirai easily exploited 
he default and weak passwords of smart home devices such 
s IP cameras and internet routers. Users of those devices 
acked knowledge and were not conscious of the security risks 
o they could not have been capable guardians. In the case 
f Mirai, there was convergence in time and (cyber)space of 
otivated offenders, suitable targets and the lack of a ca- 
able guardian. Companies must change their approach and 
e forced to ensure that no devices use default passwords.
tandards would be capable guardians if they were effectively 
mplemented. We cannot rely on consumers to know when 
nd how to change their passwords. They should be guided 
hrough this process. 
The implementation of a standard requiring to set up 
nique and well-protected passwords by the manufacturers 
nd providers of IoT devices and services would have reduced 
he criminals’ accessibility to victims, their suitability as tar- 
ets and, therefore, possibly prevented the damage caused by 
he Mirai botnet. Questions such as how often will those pass- 
ords need to be changed, will users remember to change 
hem and where will they store them, would need to be cov- 
red by cybersecurity standards to prevent threats from ma- 
erialising. The ETSI standard asks for changing default pass- 
ords but does not provide a detailed enough answer to the 
revious questions. Standards should probably provide more 
uidance in relation to this issue. 52 Engadget, ‘Mirai Botnet Hackers will Serve their Time Work- 
ng for the FBI’ (2018) < https://www.engadget.com/2018/09/20/ 
irai- botnet- hackers- serve- time- fbi/?guccounter=1&guce _ 
eferrer _ us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce _ 







On a side note, smart devices often talk with each other 
o it is important to prevent hackers from being able to gain 
ontrol of all devices by only hacking one of them. We can 
magine a situation where a hacker turns on a light bulb to 
et the system know that someone is home. The system (such 
s Google’s Nest central app) would then turn off the smart 
larm and the criminal could steal property without being 
etected. In this situation, there would be convergence in 
ime and space of a motivated offender, a suitable target and 
he lack of a guardian. Concerning suitable targets, the value 
ere would be property, the visibility the smart devices con- 
ected to the internet, accessibility their weak security set- 
ings and no inertial properties. The capable guardian would 
ot be present as the hacker would be able to see, for example
hrough smart cameras, that no one was home. One hack can 
ead to the whole smart home being under threat. Organisa- 
ions developing and deploying IoT devices need to implement 
ybersecurity standards, and experts need to write the right 
tandards, otherwise hackers will continue to have an easy 
ob. 
Going back to the Mirai case study, the features of the 
atabox would help as well as they would make systems re- 
ilient to outages for example. Key services would continue to 
ork limiting the impact of the Mirai botnet. However, with- 
ut implementing best practices based on standards, in par- 
icular in terms of password protection, the Databox would 
ave difficulties in being a capable guardian in the Mirai af- 
air. While safer than cloud architectures, the edge also has 
ts limitations. It is essential for standards to support Databox 
n ensuring the security of smart homes and their owners. Ar- 
hitectures, standards and regulations implemented together 
an become a capable guardian. 
. Conclusion and future research 
oday, smart homes are insecure environments. The high 
umber of security breaches, the rising number of internal 
nd external threats linked to smart home devices, and the 
any situational and informational harms they have caused 
rove this. 
Standards influence the activities of all stakeholders in 
he IoT world. Current standards written to increase secu- 
ity in smart homes are developed on the basis of cloud 
rchitectures. They are often obvious demands setting out 
hat should have been done from the beginning such as the 
no default password” requirement. Unfortunately, IoT prod- 
cts often continue to ignore those requirements, standards 
o not contain enough guidance on how the latter should 
e implemented and security breaches continue to take 
lace. 
A new architecture to help mitigate harms is needed. RAT 
elped us see inadequacies in current standards and also 
elped us analyse the value of edge computing for creat- 
ng a safer and more secure architecture. PIMS such as the 
atabox are an opportunity to foster the successful develop- 
ent of smart homes as they can make IoT devices and ser- 
ices more accountable to individuals than in a cloud archi- 

















































tecture scenario.153 Furthermore, by moving to the edge, we
are able to remedy the absence of ‘reliable guardians’ which
can then protect the ‘suitable targets’ of insecure IoT devices
from ‘motivated offenders’. Of course, companies have rea-
sons to continue using the cloud-based architectures for IoT
products. Mining data of consumers can contribute to increas-
ing their revenue streams and economic benefits. However,
there is no reason why companies would not switch to the
Databox model if they were incentivised to do so, for example,
by policy makers who could take measures that benefit those
adopting the Databox. Indeed, under article 25 of the GDPR,
companies should already be putting in place data protec-
tion by design and default, by employing organisational and
technical safeguards to protect processing of personal data.
Moreover, more research is needed to evaluate whether the
benefits of gaining the trust of consumers and making smart
homes more secure are higher for IoT stakeholders than the
benefits currently associated with convenience of the cloud
(as contrasted with concerns about mining users’ data in the
cloud). 
There should also be more research done on the actual con-
tent of standards written for edge computing. Some of the lat-
ter would differ from the cloud-based standards as the local
storage of data and how to maintain a secure environment
would require guidance for vendors of such edge approaches.
Moreover, current standards do not keep up with threat lev-
els, do not provide enough detail on the best approach to take
and many standards are written by various organisations on
the same topic (which adds to the confusion around best prac-
tices in standards’ implementation). 53 Crabtree and others We also argue in favour of understanding technology use
in practice. There are increasing numbers of in-home hu-
man threats linked to smart home devices, in addition to the
vast external threat landscape. As we have seen, no standards
dealing with these problems seem to have been developed so
far. Maybe it’s an omission which needs to be rectified (stan-
dards could potentially shape design of IoT products to re-
move affordances for in-home human threats) or maybe they
are not the right instrument to do so. Nevertheless, further
research in this area is needed. If standards cannot help in
this context, are there other regulatory tools that could re-
solve human threats inside the home? Criminal law may be
one, but this moves us into a separate domain, requiring fo-
cus on digital forensics for evidence collection and access to
justice to prosecute cybercrimes. Securing the IoT needs us
to rethink current technical architectures, question the social
dimensions of attack(ers) and threats, and question assump-
tions underpinning emergent IoT standards. 
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